The impact of wartime information strategy on defence capabilities. The case of the Russo-Ukrainian war
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Faculty of National Security, War Studies University in Warsaw
Expert in the Academic Centre for Strategic Communication, War Studies University in Warsaw
Publication date: 2023-10-31
Cybersecurity and Law 2023;10(2):283–298
In 2021 global arms spending reached a record-breaking level of $ 2,11 trillion. This trend can be expected to develop due to the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. The Russian invasion has undoubtedly contributed to increased demand in the arms industry. The capabilities of domestic arms markets of conflicting parties is not a determining factor of the result of the war. Opponents’ activities in the information environment are also greatly important, as they often determine the response of the international community, and influence the support awarded by individual states. The financing of arms supplies to Ukraine may serve as a good example of such correlation. The arms that Ukraine is acquiring surely improve the country’s defence capabilities, with the support gained by Ukraine being the result of Kyiv’s well thought-out and consistent actions in the information sphere. This paper aims to explain the effects of wartime information strategy on Ukrainian defence capabilities.
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